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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Carlos Adrian Cruz-Romero appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony
driving under the influence, and argues that the district court erred by granting the
State's motion in limine to exclude evidence that the lntoxilyzer used to test his breathalcohol content was not working properly. He asks that this Court vacate his judgment
of conviction and guilty plea, reverse the order granting the State's motion in limine, and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Jerome County Police arrested Mr. Cruz-Romero on April 27, 2014, for
driving under the influence. (R., pp.15-17.) The police gave him a breathalyzer test
after they took him to the Jerome County Jail. (R., p.17.) He tested at .097 and .096.

(Id.) The State later charged Mr. Cruz-Romero with felony DUI, I.C §§ 18-8004, 188005(6), misdemeanor possession of an open container in a vehicle, I.C. § 23-505,
driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001, and resisting and obstructing, I.C. § 18-705.
(R., pp.65-67.)
The State filed a motion in limine asking the court to prevent Mr. Cruz-Romero
from presenting evidence that the lntoxilyzer had malfunctioned. (R., pp.144-46.) At a
hearing on that motion, Deputy Sedlmayr, who is a breath test specialist, testified about
the lntoxilyzer 5000 that was used to take Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath sample. (Tr., p.6,
Ls.4-21.) Deputy Sedlmayr explained that he does calibration tests on the lntoxilyzer to
ensure that it is working properly. (Tr., p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.8.) During those calibration
tests, he uses two different solutions-a .08 solution and a .2 solution-and checks to

1

sure the lntoxilyzer reading is within the permissible range.

, p.7, L.8 - p.8,

11.)

Deputy Sedlmayr also testified about specific calibration tests, as well as
instances in which the lntoxilyzer was "out of tolerance," between April and August
The lntoxilyzer was out of tolerance on April 5. (Tr., p.19, Ls.11-19; see also

2014.

Def. Ex. A, 1 p.1.) Deputy Sedlmayr did not know what was done about that problem,
and it appears he was unable to explain what would normally be done about such a
problem.

(Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.10).

The lntoxilyzer tested in tolerance during

calibration tests on April 8 and May 9. (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-13; see also Def. Ex. A, pp.1, 3.)
The lntoxilyzer was out of tolerance on May 15 and 16, but a calibration test later on
May 16 showed it was in tolerance.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.8-25; see also Def. Ex. A, p.4.)

Deputy Sedlmayr could not explain what had happened on May 15 and 16. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.1-3.)
Deputy Sedlmayr also testified that on August 5, 2014, the lntoxilyzer was not
calibrating properly for the .2 solution. (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-25; see also Def. Ex. A, p.7.)
The lntoxilyzer was taken out of service on August 29, 2014. (Tr., p.9, L.5- p.10, L.12;

see also Def. Ex. A, p.8.) After a series of tests, Deputy Sedlmayr and Rachel Cutler2
from the Idaho State Police laboratory concluded that the lntoxilyzer was out of
tolerance due to a problem with one of the jars used to perform a calibration test.

The court admitted the lntoxilyzer's instrument operations log, for purposes of the
hearing, as Defendant's Exhibit A at the 12/1/14 hearing on the State's motion in
limine. That exhibit is found in the electronic document containing the non-confidential
exhibits. The page numbers refer to the pages of the exhibit itself, not the electronic
document.
2 Ms. Cutler did not testify at the hearing on the State's motion in limine.
1

2

, p.8, L.25 - p.11, L. 13.) That jar may have been in use as early as March 2014, but
Deputy Sedlmayr was unaware of any problems with it until August 5. 2014. (Tr., p.11,
L.19 - p.12, L.7.)

Deputy Sedlmayr said that, to the best of his knowledge, the

lntoxilyzer was working properly on April 27, 2014

(Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.13, L.3.)

He

concluded as much because the April 8 and May 9 calibration tests were normal, and
he knew of no other problems with the lntoxilyzer between those dates. (Tr., p.24, L.16
- p.25, L 13.)
During cross examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Sedlmayr a series of
questions related to the problems and potential problems with the lntoxilyzer:
Q: What are some of the things that can cause the machine to go
out of tolerance?
A: If it's not calibrating properly, if it's not within those ranges, it will
say that it's out of tolerance, and it will stop the testing procedure.
Q: And can those problems with the instrument affect the results of
a blow?
A: With how the lntoxilyzer 5000 is set up, due to the fact that it's
out of tolerance, as I mentioned before, it won't allow the testing
procedure to proceed. So if it goes-if it's not out of tolerance, then it is
within proper evidentiary parameters.
Q: What-can there be issues with the instrument where it doesn't show
up that it's out of tolerance but there are still issues with the instrument?
A: Not that I'm aware of. There's a lot of different checks and
balances for-and information along those lines. I would have to refer you
to Rachel Cutler from the ISP Forensic Lab.
Q: So you don't have the knowledge to answer that?
A: No.
Q: And just to clarify your answer with regards to the testing jar,
these out of tolerances that I have asked you about would have nothing to
do with that jar-correct?-that we know of?
A: I can't say whether it would be or not. If it was out of tolerance
and I can't recall, I can't say.
Q: Okay. And with regard to what Rachel Cutler did tell you, she
indicated she couldn't find anything wrong; correct?
A: Correct.
Q: But that doesn't mean that there wasn't a leak?"
A: Correct.
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, p.22, L.4 - p.23, L.17.)
Based on that testimony, the State argued:
[T)he lntox machine was working properly on the date and time in
question .... Any other time outside of that time frame, first off, would be
misleading and irrelevant to a jury in the fact that there is nothing to show
that on the day in question, the lntox machine instrument was not working
properly.
Unless the defense attorney can come up with an expert that says
that the machine was, in fact, not working on that day, all the testimony
that we heard today does show that it was working properly, checked
properly, calibrated properly and, therefore, that those breath tests were
accurate.
(Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.12; see also Tr., p.31, L.17 - p.33, L.18 3 .) Defense counsel
countered:
[A)ll of this information should be presented to the jury for them to
determine whether or not this machine or instrument was working properly
I believe there is evidence that a jury could determine that this
instrument was not working properly; that between April and August we
had issue after issue after issue until we finally pulled it out of commission.
There is a fundamental difference between Rachel Cutler saying the
machine is fine, and she can't find anything wrong with it and giving
instruction on what should be done if there continues to be a problem.
Your Honor, one thing that we did have from Deputy Sedlmayr is
that if the .20 solution is out, it could have an effect on that .08 solution,
and it could have-the test results could be higher. He did indicate he
was not the expert on that particular set of circumstances and that would
be for Rachel Cutler, Your Honor, but the burden of proof isn't on the
defendant. The burden of proof is on the State to establish that this
instrument was operating properly, and I don't believe a simple test on the
day in question is sufficient to do that when the log surrounding that test
indicates there's an issue with the machine to a point the [sic] we have to
take it out in August.
(Tr., p.28, L.16 - p.29, L.22.)

The State appeared to argue that, even if relevant, the evidence should be excluded
because it is misleading. See I.R.E. 403. Although the district court never decided that
issue, Mr. Cruz-Romero contends that the evidence he wished to present is in no way
misleading.
3

4

When asked what the probative value was of any evidence about the lntoxilyzer
malfunctioning either before April 8 or after May 9, given that Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath
test was taken on April 27, defense counsel responded:
[JJust because it calibrated on those days does not mean this instrument
was working during those dates ... It calibrated, and we have a test after it
was out of tolerance, and we have no information as to why it was out of
tolerance. . .
And it is still probative value [sic] for this jury to understand that this
instrument had issues during this time frame in and around those
calibrations where it wasn't working properly, and it was out of tolerance.
It's up to the jury to decide whether or not this instrument and the reading
that it gave us is something that they believe establishes the BAC beyond
a reasonable doubt
(Tr., p.30, L.16-p.31, L.14.)
Defense counsel further argued that, because the State would present evidence
that the lntoxilyzer was working properly when Mr. Cruz-Romero gave his breath
sample, he should be able to cross examine the State's witnesses about that
conclusion

(Tr., p.34, Ls.18-24, p.35, Ls.5-9.) Although Ms. Cutler would apparently

only testify as a rebuttal witness if needed to counter a defense expert, defense counsel
asserted that Mr. Cruz-Romero had a right to cross-examine Deputy Sedlmayr.
(Tr., p.34, Ls.3-18, p.35, Ls.5-9.)
The district court granted the State's motion:
The Court is going to-as far as the evidence of the malfunctioning of the
lntox 5000, the evidence before the court, at this time, demonstrates that
between the certification of the machine on April 8th and the recertification
on May 9th that it does appear, at least from the logs, that the machine
was working properly at that time. There is no indication about a
tolerance.
Presumptively, the State's evidence will demonstrate the
certification for the lntoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results. Absent
expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that any evidence of
indications that the lntox 5000 was out of tolerance either before April 8th
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of 2014 or after May 9th, 2014, is not of probative value. And certainly if
the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler, then that certainly may change
the analysis, but at this time, the Court does find that the test results
before April 8th and after May 9th are not relevant and would not be
admissible at trial. ...
(Tr., p.35, L.10- p.36, L.6.)
Mr. Cruz-Romero then entered into a conditional plea agreement. He pied guilty
to felony DUI, and the State dismissed the remaining charges.

(Tr., p.39, Ls.20-23,

p.54, L.22 - p.56, L.19.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State would recommend
that the court impose a ten-year sentence, with three years fixed; suspend the sentence
and place Mr. Cruz-Romero on probation for five years; and suspend his license for five
years. (Tr., p.39, Ls.4-5, p.39, L.23 - p.40, L.1.) The probation portion of the plea was
binding on the court. (Tr., p.39, Ls.3-4.) Mr. Cruz-Romero also reserved the right to
challenge the court's order granting the State's motion in limine.

(Tr., p.40, Ls.3-7.)

The court sentenced Mr. Cruz-Romero according to the plea agreement (R., pp.167-7 4;
Tr., p.64, Ls.2-15), and he timely appealed (R., pp.187-89).
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ISSUES
Did the district court err by granting the State's motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning?
II

Did the district court violate Mr. Cruz-Romero's constitutional right to present a
complete defense by excluding evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting The State's Motion In Limine To
Exclude Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning

A

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it granted the State's motion in

limine. The district court first found that the lntoxilyzer was working properly on the day
in question, an issue that should have been left to the jury. From that conclusion, the
court erroneously found that evidence showing that the lntoxilyzer was out of tolerance
before April 8 and after May 9 was not relevant and would be excluded from trial.
Finally, the court held that Mr. Cruz-Romero may be able to introduce that evidence to
challenge Ms. Cutler's, but not Deputy Sedlmayr's, testimony.

Those rulings were

erroneous, and thus district court abused its discretion by granting the State's motion in
limine.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the district court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014). "A trial
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2)
acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards,
and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Whether evidence is relevant is a matter of law which this Court
reviews de novo. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1, 54-55 (2015).
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C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State's Motion In
Limine To Exclude Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning
Relevant evidence, or "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence," I.R.E. 401, is generally admissible,
l.R.E. 402; State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 596 (2007) (explaining that evidence that is

relevant to a "material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged" is generally
admissible).

"[l]t is well established that a defendant may challenge a breathalyzer

insofar as it measured the defendant's breath alcohol concentration, including whether
the breathalyzer accurately measured his breath alcohol concentration, whether the
particular device was working properly at the time of the breath test, and whether the
breath test was properly administered " State v. Tomlinson, No. 41913, 2015 WL
1529416, at *8 (Idaho Ct App. April 7, 2015) (surveying cases).
The Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400 (Ct. App. 2001)
is instructive. The Ward Court held that, after having determined that Ward's breath test
was admissible at trial, the magistrate erred by prohibiting Ward "from attacking the
accuracy, weight, or reliability to be afforded to the test results at trial." Id. at 405. The
Court of Appeals explained that "[t]he burden of persuading the jury that the test results
are accurate remains with the prosecution." and thus "'the reliability and performance of
any given

machine

is

subject to

challenge."'

Id.

at 404

(quoting

State

v.

Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 375 (Ct. App. 1987) (superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, 212-13 (Ct. App. 1992)).

"If there is

evidence that any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so
as to produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant both to the
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admissibility and the weight of the test results,"
Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375),

Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 (quoting

Such evidence might include "concessions elicited on

cross-examination of the officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense
expert" Ward, 135 Idaho at 404,
The Court of Appeals' decision in In re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879 (Ct App, 2012),
addressed this issue in the context of an administrative license suspension, Hubbard
argued that "evidence of a wide fluctuation in performance verification readings
immediately prior to and immediately after her September 6, 2010, [breath] test"
indicated that the breath-testing machine was malfunctioning

Id at 882, The district

court, however, held that the performance verification result on the day of Hubbard's
breath test established, as a matter of law, that the machine was working correctly, Id
at 883, The Court of Appeals did "not agree with that analysis":
Compliance with the ISP's standards for operation of the instrument is not
a guarantee that it was operating correctly, Inadequate or incomplete
operating standards and procedures could fail to disclose when a testing
instrument is not functioning correctly, In , , , [Hartwig,] we held that
although breath test results were properly admitted into evidence at a
criminal trial because the State showed that the designated state agency
had approved the machine for use and that the machine was operated in
compliance with approved standards, the reliability and performance of the
machine is still subject to challenge, We stated: "If there is evidence that
any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so
as to produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant to both
the admissibility and weight of the test results,"
Id (quoting Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375) (internal citations omitted),

Because Hubbard challenged her administrative license suspension, she had the
burden to show the breath-testing machine had malfunctioned, The Court of Appeals
concluded that she had not met that burden:

10

The only evidence of any irregularity or anomaly in the instrument's
performance was the printout that indicated a performance verification
reading of .042 for a solution with a known alcohol concentration of .083
ten days before Hubbard's test. There was no testimony as to the
significance or possible causes of this anomaly. For example, it cannot be
discerned whether the .042 reading was the result of an actual, purposeful
performance verification test, or some accidental or uncontrolled activation
of the equipment. SOP 7.1.2 identifies a number of factors that could
account for an aberrant verification result, including incorrect use of hoses,
not having the instrument properly warmed, and incorrect blowing
technique by the operator. The evidence here does not rule out any of
these possible explanations for the .042 result on the instrument's printout.
Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883-84.

As an initial matter, the court here abused its discretion by making a factual
finding that should have been left to the jury. See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404-05 ('The
burden of persuading the jury that the test results are accurate remains with the
prosecution."); Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883 (disapproving of the district court's
conclusion that "the ISP's acceptable performance verification result on the day of
Hubbard's test established that the machine was working correctly as a matter of law.")
The district court found that the evidence in this case "demonstrates that between the
certification of the machine on April 8th and the recertification on May 9th that it does
appear, at least from the logs, that the machine was working properly at that time."

(Tr., p.35, Ls.13-17 (emphasis added.) Based on its determination that the lntoxilyzer
was working properly, the court found that the evidence regarding the malfunctioning
lntoxilyzer was not "of probative value." (Tr., p.35, L.25.) The court's inquiry should
have been limited to determining whether evidence about the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning
between April and August was relevant to prove or disprove a disputed issue.
See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404; Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883; I.R.E 401, 402. The court
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thus abused its discretion by finding that the lntoxilyzer was working properly between
April 8 and May 9.
Second, the court erred by finding that evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning
was not relevant.

See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 ("'Obviously the reliability and

performance of any given machine is subject to challenge."') (quoting Hartwig, 112
Idaho at 375); Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883 ("If there is evidence that any particular
machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so as to produce unreliable
results, such evidence would be relevant to both the admissibility and weight of the test
results.") (quoting Hartwig, 112 Idaho at 375). The evidence presented at the motion in
limine hearing showed that the evidence was relevant to a material and disputed issue
in the case-whether Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath sample was accurate-and therefore
whether he in fact committed the crime charged. See l.R.E. 401, 402. The lntoxilyzer
used to test Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath on April 27 tested out of tolerance on April 5,
May 15, and May 16 (Tr., p.19, Ls.11

9, p.21, Ls.8-25; Def. Ex. A, pp.1, 4); the

lntoxilyzer did not calibrate properly on August 5, apparently because of a problem with
a solution jar that was used as early as March 2014 (Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.12, L.7; Def. Ex.
A, p.7); Deputy Sedlmayr could not say whether the malfunctions in April and May were
related to that jar (Tr., p.23, Ls.4-10); and Deputy Sedlmayr could only infer that the
lntoxilyzer was working properly on the day in question (Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.13, L.3, p.24,
L.16-p.25, L.13.).
Indeed, the evidence of the lntoxilyzer's malfunction in this case is much stronger
than in Hubbard.

In Hubbard, there was just one problem with the breath-testing

machine ten days before Hubbard's breath test, and "[t]here was no testimony as to the

12

significance or possible causes of this anomaly."

Hubbard, 152 Idaho at 883.

In

essence, the court did not know what significance, if any, that problem had on the
validity of Hubbard's breath test, and it was Hubbard's burden to show the test result
was unreliable. Id. at 883-4. Crucially, however, the burden of proof here is on the
State.

Given the evidence discussed above, the State did not and cannot meet its

burden of showing that the lntoxilyzer was functioning properly-there were problems
with the lntoxilyzer during the months surrounding Mr. Cruz-Romero's April 27 breath
sample, and the State could not explain what caused all of those problems, whether
they were remedied in any way, 4 or whether they may have affected Mr. Cruz-Romero's
breath sample. 5 The evidence relating to the lntoxilyzer's performance between April
and August 2014 is thus relevant to determining whether Mr. Cruz-Romero's breath
sample was accurate. The court erred by concluding otherwise.
Finally, the court abused its discretion by holding that Mr. Cruz-Romero may
have been able to introduce that evidence to cross-examine Ms. Cutler, but not Deputy
Sedlmayr. The court did not provide its reasoning for differentiating between the two
witnesses; it simply stated:

Even though Deputy Sedlmayr provided an explanation for the problem in August
(Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.11, L 13), Mr. Cruz-Romero contends that even that issue should be
put to a jury.
5 Again, Deputy Sedlmayr testified as follows:
Q: What-can there be issues with the instrument where it doesn't
show up that it's out of tolerance but there are still issues with the
instrument?
A: Not that I'm aware of. There's a lot of different checks and
balances for-and information along those lines. I would have to refer you
to Rachel Cutler from the ISP Forensic Lab.
Q: So you don't have the knowledge to answer that?
A: No.
(Tr., p.22, L.18 - p.23, L.3.)
4
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Presumptively, the State's evidence will demonstrate the
certification for the lntoxilyzer, the reliability of the test results. Absent
expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that any evidence of
indications that the lntox 5000 was out of tolerance either before April 8th
of 2014 or after May 9th, 2014, is not of probative value. And certainly if
the State does intend to call Ms. Cutler, then that certainly may change
the analysis, but at this time, the Court does find that the test results
before April 8th and after May 9th are not relevant and would not be
admissible at trial. ...
(Tr., p.35, L.10 - p.36, L.6.)
Regardless of whether Ms. Culter or Deputy Sedlmayr testified about the breath
test results, the State would rely on the results to prove its case and so Mr. CruzRomero had a right to cross-examine the State's witnesses about their conclusions.
See Ward, 135 Idaho at 404 ("[O]nce the trial court has made the threshold

determination of admissibility [of the test result], a defendant is free to attack the
reliability and accuracy of the admitted evidence through the presentation of evidence at
trial.

This evidence could include concessions elicited on cross-examination of the

officer who administered the test or testimony from a defense expert.") (internal citation
omitted).

The district court abused its discretion by holding that the evidence might

come in only if Ms. Cutler testified. The court should have denied the State's motion in
limine.
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II
The District Court Violated Mr. Cruz-Romero's Constitutional Right To Present A
Complete Defense By Excluding Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning

A.

Introduction
Mr. Cruz-Romero has a constitutional right to present a complete defense. That

includes the right to introduce evidence and cross examine witnesses regarding the
lntoxilyzer's performance in order to challenge the validity of his breath test results. By
precluding Mr. Cruz-Romero from presenting such evidence, the court deprived
Mr. Cruz-Romero of his right to present a complete defense.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court exercises "free review over the trial court's determination of whether

due process standards have been satisfied " State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788
(Ct. App. 1999).

C.

The District Court Violated Mr. Cruz-Romero's Constitutional Right To Present A
Complete Defense By Excluding Evidence Of The lntoxilyzer Malfunctioning
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right

to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront
and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been
recognized as essential to due process." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294
(1973); see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (the right to present a
complete defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment); see also ID. CONST., art. I, §
13. Although the right to cross examine may "bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process . .

its denial or significant diminution calls into
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question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the
competing interest be closely examined "
quotation marks omitted).

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (internal

If "the application of rules of evidence deprives a criminal

defendant of a fair opportunity to defend against the charge, the conviction cannot
stand." State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S.
at 302-03 and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967)) (overruled on other
grounds as recognized by State v. Galvan, 156 Idaho 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2014).
The district court's erroneous exclusion of relevant evidence denied Mr. CruzRomero his due process right to cross examine the witnesses against him. As argued
by defense counsel:
[W]hat the State's asking us to do is be precluded from cross examining
their expert as to their conclusions. If the expert's allowed to testify based
on whatever information they have that this machine is working properly,
the defense has a right to question what they base that decision on.
[Officer Stedlmayr] is considered an expert on the breath testing
machine. He's going to testify that it was working properly. I, again, have
a right to cross examine that opinion.
(Tr., p.34, L.18 - p.35, L.9.) The State's case rested on the breath test results, and so
Mr. Cruz-Romero had a right to challenge that result

When the court erroneously

precluded Mr. Cruz-Romero from calling the results into question, it deprived him of his
constitutional right to defend against the State's accusations. See Chambers, 410 U.S.
at 295; U.S. CONST., amend. VI; ID. CONST., art. I,§ 13. Because the court erroneously
found the evidence to be irrelevant, this was not an instance in which that right merely
bowed to other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.
U.S. at 295.

See Chambers, 410

The district court therefore deprived Mr. Cruz-Romero of due process

when it excluded the evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cruz-Romero respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and guilty plea, reverse the order granting the State's motion to suppress,
and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 29 th day of September, 2015.

772 ~ J--?,JJd-,,,.._
MAYA P.ALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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